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Action dynamics reveal two types of
cognitive flexibility in a homonym
relatedness judgment task
Maja Dshemuchadse*, Tobias Grage and Stefan Scherbaum
Department of Psychology, Technische Universität Dresden, Dresden, Germany
Cognitive flexibility is a central component of executive functions that allow us to behave
meaningful in an ever changing environment. Here, we support a distinction between
two different types of cognitive flexibility, shifting flexibility and spreading flexibility, based
on independent underlying mechanisms commonly subsumed under the ability to shift
cognitive sets. We use a homonym relatedness judgment task and combine it withmouse
tracking to show that these two types of cognitive flexibility follow independent temporal
patterns in their influence on participants’ mouse movements during relatedness
judgments. Our results are in concordance with the predictions of a neural field based
framework that assumes the independence of the two types of flexibility. We propose
that future studies about cognitive flexibility in the area of executive functions should
take independent types into account, especially when studying moderators of cognitive
flexibility.
Keywords: cognitive flexibility, priming, homonym, dynamics, continuous time, mouse movements, executive
functions, relatedness judgment
Introduction
As humans, we are able to adapt our goals and our behavior to a constantly changing environment.
The flexibility to shift cognitive sets is a central part of executive functions (e.g., Miyake et al.,
2000; Diamond, 2013). It requires either identifying alternatives related to the original set or
overcoming perseveration on previous sets by shifting to a new alternative set. In the research on
executive functions, cognitive flexibility is usually studied in two ways. The first approach focusses
on task-switching (e.g., Monsell, 2003), set-shifting (e.g., Dreisbach and Goschke, 2004) or related
paradigms that reveal switch costs (higher response times) in switch trials—where one has to switch
from one task to another one—compared to repeat trials—where the same task is performed again.
Several influences on this type of cognitive flexibility have been identified. For instance, it has been
found that positive mood increases cognitive flexibility and thereby reduces switch costs (Dreisbach
and Goschke, 2004). Interestingly, this influence of positive mood on cognitive flexibility builds
the link to the second approach that focusses on the breadth of attention, as studied, e.g., with
the flanker task (Eriksen and Eriksen, 1974) or with semantic tasks as the remote associates task
(Mednick et al., 1964). The flanker task—in which one has to respond to a central target while
ignoring flanking stimuli—shows the congruency effect, so that incongruent trials—in which center
and flanking stimuli point to different responses—are slower than congruent trials—in which
center and flanking stimuli point to the same response. This congruency effect increases with
decreasing distance between center and flanking stimuli (Eriksen and Eriksen, 1974). Interestingly,
positive mood also increases the congruency effect similar to effects of positive mood on the
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detection of remote associates in the remote associates task (Rowe
et al., 2007). These findings are interpreted as an increase in the
breadth of attention and hence increased cognitive flexibility.
The link between the two approaches—shifting and attentional
breadth—as indicated by the effects of positive mood is also
innate in other conceptualizations of executive functions, i.e.,
the shielding-shifting dilemma that assumes the shifting of goals
and the shielding from distraction as opposing constraints of the
cognitive system that span the dimension of cognitive flexibility
(Goschke and Bolte, 2014).
Here, we argue, that despite the common influence of positive
mood and the apparent similarities of these conceptualizations,
the two approaches tackle different types of cognitive flexibility
based on independent underlying mechanisms: The ability
to identify related alternatives or to completely shift to new
alternatives comprise two distinct and independent aspects of
cognitive flexibility, that become evident when referring to neural
mechanisms. We will call the first type shifting flexibility—the
ability to overcome perseveration by switching from an active
neural pattern representing a certain cognitive set to a new
one; and we will call the second type spreading flexibility—
the ability to identify related alternative cognitive sets based
on the spread of activation to nearby neural patterns. A classic
example for these two abilities stems from the field of problem
solving: Duncker’s candle task (Duncker, 1945). Participants
are given a box of tacks, matches, and a candle. Then they
are instructed to attach the candle to a wall of corkboard and
to light it (compare Isen et al., 1987). The “correct” solution
is to use the tacks’ box as platform for the candle and to
attach this platform to the wall using the tacks. However, a
typical phenomenon is functional fixedness: participants are
not able to leave the functional cognitive set associated with
the single items: they only explore different functions in the
vicinity of the original functions (for example, using the melted
wax of the candle as glue). Within this candle task, spreading
flexibility describes the exploration of all ideas related to the
original function of the items, while shifting flexibility would
mean to shift to a completely new function—leaving functional
fixedness.
Decomposing these two types of cognitive flexibility and
their underlying cognitive processes experimentally, however,
poses a methodological challenge: Typical approaches either
analyze inter-individual variance in different tasks (e.g., Miyake
et al., 2000) or analyze patterns of lesions or neural activation
between different brain regions (e.g., Koechlin et al., 2003;
Stuss and Alexander, 2007). Both approaches require a large
number of participants and inter-individual variability to
differentiate components, and both approaches are correlational
in using given inter-personal variation. For example, in their
seminal study on components of executive functions, Miyake
and colleagues measured 137 participants—all undergraduate
students—on 14 tasks, identifying 3 specialized and 1 general
components of executive functions via factorial analysis (Miyake
et al., 2000). However, in later studies, measuring participants
between 20 and 81 years, an additional fourth specialized
component was identified (Fisk and Sharp, 2004).While this does
not question the original three components, it illustrates that
variance between participants is necessary in this approach to
identify specific components.
To go beyond such correlative analyses, experimental
approaches manipulate task-requirements of different
components and measure the resulting differences in response
times and error rates (e.g., Braver, 2012). We will embrace
and add to this experimental approach by adopting a dynamic
continuous perspective (Spivey and Dale, 2004, 2006; Spencer
et al., 2009). We manipulate the requirement for the two types of
flexibility, shifting and spreading, within one task and compare
their effects continuously in time by using mouse tracking
(Spivey et al., 2005; Freeman et al., 2008; Scherbaum et al., 2010;
Dshemuchadse et al., 2012) which will enable us to distinguish
both types by their temporal profiles (Scherbaum et al., 2010). To
manipulate and measure the two types within the same task, we
will use a relatedness judgment task (Zwaan and Yaxley, 2003).
In this task, participants have to detect whether two words are
semantically related or not. Hence, participants have to search
within their semantic network to detect associations between
words (Faust and Lavidor, 2003). For this search process,
one can manipulate the level of required spreading flexibility
necessary to solve the task by varying the strength of relatedness
between words. To also manipulate and assess shifting flexibility,
we extended this task by using homonyms (Dshemuchadse,
2009)—words with two or more different meanings, i.e., bank
as a place to store and retrieve money or as the embankment of
a river. Shifting flexibility is presumed to allow individuals to
switch from one activated meaning of a homonym to another
(Simpson and Kang, 1994; Gorfein et al., 2000) when required by
the task (see Figure 2 for a sketch of the resulting task).
To illustrate our reasoning about the processes involved,
Figure 1 sketches a simplified neural framework that builds on
previous competitive activation models of ambiguity resolution
(e.g., Plaut and Booth, 2000; Twilley and Dixon, 2000; Rodd et al.,
2004). The framework assumes word meanings to be represented
by patterns of activation in a dynamic neural field (Amari, 1977;
Erlhagen and Schöner, 2002; Erlhagen and Bicho, 2006). The
neural field represents the meaning of words distributed (Rodd
et al., 2004) along a topographic semantic space (Plaut and Booth,
2000) with related word meanings positioned near to each other.
For homonyms, the two meanings are presented in separate
subspaces of the field, assuming that a homonym’s meanings
are distinct. For example, the homonym band would have two
separate peaks representing the meaning of a small orchestra
and the meaning of a tie. Activation within the field is not
limited to single points, but spreads from one unit to neighboring
units—representations of concepts are, hence, diffuse and always
co-activate related concepts that lie nearby in semantic space
(compare Quillian, 1967). The more related two concepts are, the
nearer they are to each other in the field and the stronger they
co-activate each other. For example, the words band and music
are nearer to each other and, hence, spread more activation to
each other when activated, than the words band and chord. The
priming of one of the two meanings of the homonym results
in stronger initial activation of the primed semantic subspace
of the whole homonym meaning space. For example, when
the homonym band is shown and before, the context of music
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FIGURE 1 | A conceptual neural field framework for the homonym
relatedness judgment task. (A,B) The homonym input activates two
meanings: one meaning is primed by previous information. The associate is
either placed in the primed semantic space (A) or the unprimed semantic
space (B). (C,D) Within the neural field, inputs add up, leading to an initial
advantage of the primed information. Shifting flexibility (a lower stability and
amplitude of the priming) would allow letting loose of this initial priming and
switch between the homonym’s meanings, reducing effects of initial priming,
while spreading flexibility would allow efficient searching for weakly related
meanings, reducing effects of strength of association.
was primed, the peak representing the small orchestra would be
supported by a decaying peak representing this priming.
Within this simplified neural framework with spreading
activation within the field and the decaying effect of priming,
we can derive two predictions for how fast a related word (the
associate in the following) could be identified by the model.
First, the nearer the associate is located to the homonym’s
core meaning, the better its identification is supported by the
spreading activation from the homonym. For example, the
relation between band and music is identified more quickly than
the relation between band and chord. This difference represents
the spreading flexibility: broader spread of activation should
support the identification of words less related to the core concept
activated by the homonym.
Second, an associate from within the primed subspace
can be identified more easily than an associate from within
the unprimed subspace, although the influence of priming is
expected to decay over time. For example, the wordmusic would
be identified more rapidly than the word ribbon. This difference
represents the shifting flexibility: The more stable the neural
representation of the primed homonym meaning is, the more
difficult it is to shift to a completely differentmeaning (this closely
matches the implementation of shielding in common neural
network models, e.g., O’Reilly, 2006; Herd et al., 2014).
To tackle these two types of cognitive flexibility empirically,
we created a task that asked participants to identify associates
that have first either been primed or unprimed, and second are
either strongly or weakly related to the homonym. From the
theory as sketched in the neural framework, we can derive the
following empirical hypotheses (for a formal implementation
and simulation of the framework in a dynamic neural field
model and the resulting predictions, see Supplementary Material
Data Sheet 1). First, we expect, that there will be independent
main effects in response times and error rates of priming and
association indicating the independence of the two types of
cognitive flexibility. Second, we expect that the two types will
influence participants’ mouse movements at different points in
time: the priming should be influential at an earlier time than
the strength of association and both should not interact while
active in parallel. This difference in timing and the temporal
independence would provide evidence for the independence of
the underlying processes. Third, on an inter-individual level, we
expect no correlation across participants between the two types.
Notably, due to the deliberately chosen sample size, this can only
be seen as weak and additional, but not crucial evidence.
Method
Participants
Twenty students (10 female, mean age = 24.7 years) of the
Technische Universität Dresden took part in the experiment.
All participants had normal or corrected to normal vision. They
received class credit or 5 e payment. The study was performed
in accordance with the guidelines of the Declaration of Helsinki
and of the German Psychological Society. An ethical approval
was not required since the study did not involve any risk or
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FIGURE 2 | Setup of the experiment. (A) Sequence within trials.
Participants started a trial by clicking into a red box at the bottom of the
screen. After clicking, response boxes appeared at the upper edges of the
screen and participants had to move the cursor upwards, in order to start
presentation of stimuli. After reaching a movement threshold, two words
appeared (here the homonym and the associate) and participants had to
move the mouse cursor to the left or the right response box to indicating
relatedness or not. (B) Sequence across experimental trials. Prime trials
presented associated words that activated one or the other meaning of a
homonym presented in the following homonym trial. Words in the homonym
trial could be either strongly associated or weakly associated (here: strong
association).
discomfort for the participants. All participants were informed
about the purpose and the procedure of the study and gave
written informed consent prior to the experiment. All data were
analyzed anonymously.
Materials, Apparatus, and Stimuli
The presented material consisted of 252 related/associated and
252 unrelated word-pairs (for some of these pairs existed several
versions due to different conditions, see below).
The trials of interest were so called homonym trials (84 in
number) that consisted of a German homonym (target word)
paired with a related word (the associate), which existed in
four versions derived from two factors: the associate was either
strongly associated with the respective homonym meaning or it
was weakly associated; and the associate was either related to
one meaning of the homonym or the other meaning. Each of the
homonym trials was preceded by a prime trial (84 in number)
consisting of two related words which existed in two versions:
One of the prime trial versions was priming one meaning of the
homonym; the other prime trial version was priming the other
meaning of the homonym (see Figure 2B).
To avoid participants learning and adapting to this prime-
homonym structure in the sequence of trials, we added filler trials
using further material: associated filler trials (84 in number), with
two associated words; homonym catch trials with a homonym
and an unrelated word (84 in number); filler catch trials with
two unrelated words (168 in number). The order of the different
trial types was random with the exception that prime trials and
homonym trials always followed each other. The experimental
material (prime and homonym trials) was evaluated in earlier
studies (compare Dshemuchadse, 2009) and can be found in the
Supplementary Material Table 1.
Additionally, we had 10 independent raters evaluate all of the
material (including the filler and catch trials) for relatedness.
All words presented together as target and associate in the
different conditions were rated for relatedness on a scale from
1 (“no relatedness”) to 9 (“very strong relatedness”). The order
of presentation was randomized across raters. Table 1 shows the
TABLE 1 | Relatedness Ratings (1 = unrelated, 9 = strongly related) for the
experimental homonym trials and the other four types of trials (priming,
homonym catch, filler, and filler catch) for both sets of homonym
meanings (A and B).
Homonym Trials
A strong A weak B strong B weak A-B ABS (A-B)
strong strong
Mean 6,77 4,43 6,92 4,77 −0,15 1,35
SD 1,33 1,83 1,08 1,77 1,78 1,17
Priming trials Homonym Filler
Set A Set B Catch Assoc. Catch
Mean 6,25 6,57 1,04 6,19 1,17 1,16
SD 1,66 1,30 0,90 1,45 0,97 1,12
For homonym trials, the average difference of strong associates indicates balancing of
the two homonym meanings across the two sets of meaning A/B; the average absolute
difference indicates the degree of general balance between the two homonym meanings.
average results across word pairs. The data indicate the intended
strong relatedness for priming trials, strong homonym trials and
filler trials (6.19–6.92), medium relatedness for weak homonym
trials (4.43–4.77) and almost no relatedness for filler catch and
homonym catch trials (1.04–1.17). Furthermore, we calculated
for each pair of strong associates (trial set A and B) the difference
between their homonym relatedness to estimate the degree to
which the homonym meanings were balanced. For the average
difference, the low absolute value of 0.15 indicates well balanced
homonym meanings across the two homonym trial sets A and B.
For the average of the absolute difference, the relatively low value
of 1.16 indicates a sufficient general balance of the homonym
meanings (for the complete specific word pair ratings, see the
Supplementary Material Table 1).
Stimuli (target word and associate) were presented in white on
a black background on a 17 inch screen running at a resolution of
1280×1024 pixels (75Hz refresh frequency).Words were printed
in Arial (font size: 48 pt) in the horizontal center of the screen.
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The target word was present 100 px above the vertical center,
the associate 35 px below the vertical center (this upwards bias
was chosen to suit the upwards direction of mouse movements).
Response boxes (200 px in width) were presented at the top
left and top right of the screen. For presentation, we used
Psychophysics Toolbox 3 (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997), Matlab
2006b (the Mathworks Inc.), and Windows XP. Responses were
carried out bymoving a computermouse (LogitechWheelMouse
USB), sampled with a frequency of 92Hz.
Procedure
Participants’ task on each trial was to judge whether the two
words presented were related or not. After onscreen instructions
and demonstration by the experimenter, participants practiced 20
trials, followed by themain experiment (material of these practice
trials did not appear again in the experiment).
Each trial consisted of three stages (see Figure 2A), following
an established mouse task procedure (Scherbaum et al., 2010;
Dshemuchadse et al., 2012). In the first stage, participants had
to click into a red box (140 px in width) at the bottom of
the screen within a deadline of 1.5 s. This served to produce a
comparable starting area for each trial. After clicking within this
box, the second stage started and two response boxes at the right
and left upper corner of the screen were presented. Participants
were required to start the mouse movement upwards within a
deadline of 1 s. We chose this procedure forcing participants to
be already moving when entering the decision process to assure
that they had not already decided prior to simply executing the
final movement. Only after participants moved the cursor at
least 4 pixels in each of two consecutive time steps the third
stage started with the appearance of the target word (e.g., the
homonym) and the associate (hence, the time for stages 1 and
2 could be conceptualized as the inter-trial-interval). Participants
were instructed to move the cursor into the upper left response
box to indicate that both words were related and into the upper
right box to indicate that both words were not related (directions
were balanced across participants).
The trial ended after moving the cursor into one of the
response boxes within a deadline of 2.5 s (see Figure 2). If
participants missed the deadline of one of the three stages, the
next trial started with the presentation of the red start box.
Response times (RT) were measured as the duration of the third
stage, reflecting the interval between the onset of the target
stimulus and reaching the response box with the mouse cursor.
Design
The experiment consisted of 5 types of trials (prime, homonym,
filler, catch homonym, and catch filler—see Materials, Apparatus,
and Stimuli). The main experimental manipulation concerned
the consecutive prime and homonym trials. Prime trials
primed one of the two meanings of the homonym in
the following homonym trials. Homonym trials consisted
of the homonym and an associate that was either strongly
associated or weakly associated with either one or the other
of the homonym’s meanings. Across two blocks of trials,
participants experienced each homonym twice, with each
meaning primed once (order of primed meanings was balanced
across participants). Priming and strength of association
were manipulated orthogonally (randomized), leading to a 2
(primed/unprimed) × 2 (strong/weak) design with 42 trials per
condition. As a control factor, we included repetition, the first and
second presentation of the homonym in the analysis.
Data Preprocessing
For analysis of RT and mouse movements, we excluded
erroneous trials (compare Figure 7) and trials aborted because of
participants clicking too late into the start box (0.14%) or starting
their movement too late (0.01%). On average, the inter-trial-
interval (stages 1 and 2 of the mouse procedure) lasted 1068ms
(SE= 41ms).
We aligned all movements for a common starting position
(within the range of the start box) and normalized each
movement to 100 equal time slices (Spivey et al., 2005; Scherbaum
et al., 2010). For a detailed analysis of the time course of influence
on mouse movements, we used the mouse movement trajectory
angle on the XY plane (compare Scherbaum et al., 2010) as
dependent variable. We calculated the angle relative to the y-axis
for each difference vector between two time steps1. Following
this, we prepared the temporal analysis by introducing temporal
correlation between the single data points. To this end, we filtered
the data with an 8-point Gaussian smoothing window across time
steps (the 8-point window was chosen to equal the correction
criterion for multiple testing as explained in the Results section).
Results
Discrete Results for Homonym Trials
Our main experimental interest was in the dynamics of the
two influences within homonym trials. However, as a first
check for successful manipulation and for independence of the
two factors priming and association, we performed a repeated
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) on RT and on error
rates with the factors priming (primed/unprimed), association
(strong/weak), repetition (first experience/second experience).
For RT (see Figure 3, left), this revealed significant main effects
for priming, F(1, 19) = 129.93, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.87, association,
F(1, 19) = 84.28, p< 0.001, η
2
p= 0.82, but no effect for repetition,
F(1, 19) = 0.02, p = 0.9. There was no significant interaction
(all p > 0.1). For error rates (see Figure 3, right), the analysis
yielded comparable results (priming and association: p < 0.001,
all other p > 0.09). Hence, priming and association influenced
processing independently of each other. Furthermore, the
insignificant control factor indicates that the second experience
of the word material did not influence participants’ processing
substantially.
Since, the error rates were at the 50% chance level in the
condition unprimed-weak, we aimed to ensure that participants
performed the task correctly and did not simply respond
randomly. Therefore, we performed a signal detection analysis
1Mouse movement angle has two advantages over the raw trajectory data as a
measure of movement tendency. First, it better reflects the instantaneous tendency
of the mouse movement since it is a differential measure compared to the
cumulative measure represented by raw trajectory data. Second, it integrates the
movement on the XY plane into a single measure.
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FIGURE 3 | RT (left) and error rates (right) in homonym trials as a function of association and priming. Errorbars indicate standard errors.
(Green and Swets, 1966) with thesemost difficult homonym trials
and the homonym catch trials: We coded relatedness as signal
and participants’ choices as decision. If participants decided
randomly in difficult trials, we would expect them to show
sensitivity near to zero. However, the analysis revealed a mean
sensitivity of 1.41 (SE = 0.11, t = 12.95, p < 0.001). We interpret
this as evidence that participants performed the task correctly,
even when they erred often in the most difficult condition.
With this basic pattern as expected, corroborating the
independence of the factors priming and association would
usually mean looking at inter-individual variability and to
calculate correlations for these factors across participants.
Although we measured only 20 participants, we performed this
analysis for RT and error rates (see Figure 4). Results for RT,
r = −0.08, p = 0.75, and error rates, r = 0.04, p =
0.88, indicated no correlation between the two effects across
participants. As noted in the introduction, this correlational
approach usually relies on larger number of participants.
The analysis of within trial dynamics as indicated by mouse
movements circumvents these disadvantages, as described in the
following sections.
Continuous Results for Homonym Trials
As a first validating analysis, we analyzed mouse movements for
the same effects as found in RT and errors (see Figure 5). To this
end, we calculated the degree of curvature calculated as the area
under the curve between a direct straight line movement and the
real curved movement in a trial. An ANOVA on the degree of
curvature for the factors priming (primed/unprimed), association
(strong/weak), repetition (first experience/second experience)
yielded significant main effects for priming, F(1, 19) = 100.96, p<
0.001, η2p = 0.84, association, F(1, 19) = 60.01, p < 0.001, η
2
p =
0.76, but no effect for repetition, F(1, 19) = 0.27, p = 0.61. There
was no significant interaction (all p > 0.1).
We then performed the main analysis for mouse
movements in homonym trials by time continuous multiple
regression (Notebaert and Verguts, 2007; Scherbaum
et al., 2010) on mouse movement angles (see Figure 6,
left and middle panel; additionally, see the Figure in the
Supplementary Material Image 1 for the other types of trials)
with three regressors: association (strong/weak), priming
(primed/unprimed) and the interaction association × priming.
The first two regressors were normalized to a range of [−1,
1]. To exclude multicolinearity as a source of artifacts, we
checked variance inflation factors to stay below 1.1, indicating
the necessary low level of multicolinearity.
We calculated 100 multiple regression analyses (100 time
slices→ 100 multiple regressions) yielding three time-dependent
beta weights (three weights across 100 time slices) for each
participant. For each of these three beta-weights, we computed
grand averages representing the time-varying strength of
influence for each predictor (see Figure 6, right). To analyze the
properties of these three beta-weights, we checked for relevant
temporal segments of influence by calculating t-tests against
zero for each time step of these beta-weights (Scherbaum et al.,
2010; Dshemuchadse et al., 2012). To compensate for multiple
comparisons of temporally dependent data, we followed previous
studies (Scherbaum et al., 2010; Dshemuchadse et al., 2012) and
chose as a criterion of reliability a minimum of eight consecutive
significant t-tests (see Dale et al., 2007 for Monte Carlo analyses
on this issue).
The results (see Figure 6, right, and Table 2) indicate that
association and priming followed different time courses. The
influence of priming started earlier than association [M(RT) =
552ms vs. M(RT) = 716ms], as we expected. The interaction
between both factors did not show any significant temporal
segments of influence.
Results across All Types of Trials
Our main focus was on the experimental investigation of the
dynamics within the homonym trials. To check for the validity
of the overall experiment, we also analyzed RT and error rates of
the different types of trials (see Figure 7).
We performed an ANOVA on RT for the factor trial
type (priming, homonym, filler, homonym catch, filler catch),
revealing significant differences F(1.62, 30.75)2 = 14.83, p <
2Greenhouse-Geisser corrected.
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FIGURE 4 | Scatter plots of the effect of association (strong-weak) and the effect of priming (primed-unprimed) for RT (left) and error rates (right) of
each participant.
FIGURE 5 | Heatmaps showing log10 probabilities of correct-response mouse movements in homonym trials on the XY plane for the factors priming
and association (pooled for all participants). Participants started at the bottom center and moved to the upper-right response box.
0.001, η2p = 0.44. Post-hoc t-tests revealed this difference to be
located between priming, homonym, and filler trials on the one
side and homonym catch and filler catch trials on the other side
(all p < 0.01, uncorrected). Hence, this effect indicates that
finding an association was easier than rejecting any association.
Concerning error rates, an ANOVA also revealed significant
differences for the factor trial type F(1.42, 26.94)2 = 33.57, p
< 0.001, η2p = 0.64. Post-hoc t-tests revealed priming (M =
16.64%, SE = 2.03%) and filler (M = 18.51%, SE = 2.28%)
trials to be similar, as well as homonym catch (M = 8.72%, SE =
2%) and filler catch (M = 7.72%, SE = 1.68%) trials. Homonym
(M = 30.03%, SE= 2.05%) trials were significantly different to all
other trials (all p < 0.001). Homonym catch and filler catch were
different to all non-catch trials (all p < 0.01). Again, finding an
association was different to rejecting any association—the lower
error rate for catch trials indicates, however, a speed-accuracy
trade-off: instead of risking missing an association, participants
seemed to double check before responding that no association
was present.
Discussion
The aim of our study was to decompose cognitive flexibility
as a component of executive functions into two distinguishable
types, namely shifting flexibility—the readiness to switch between
cognitive sets—and spreading flexibility—the ability to identify
related cognitive sets. To overcome the limitations of inter-
individual correlational approaches, we chose an experimental
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FIGURE 6 | Left and middle: Mouse movement angle for the conditions association (left) and priming (middle). Right: Results of continuous regression on
mouse movement angle. Bars above data indicate significant t-tests against zeros. Shaded areas indicate standard-errors.
TABLE 2 | Timing of the influence of priming and association on mouse
movement angles.
Significant temporal segments
REGRESSOR
Priming Time steps 47–79
M(RT) 552–927ms
Association Time steps 61–76
M(RT) 716–892ms
Priming × Association Time steps –
M(RT) –
approach using a homonym relatedness judgment task combined
with mouse movements. The former served to manipulate the
two types within the same task; the latter allowed us to dissociate
the two types by their temporal variance within trials.
Our results indicate that the manipulation of the two types
leads to independent effects. This independence is reflected on
the one hand in distinct temporal patterns of influence within
trials as measured with mouse movements, and on the other
hand in independent correlational patterns of RT and error
rates across participants. These results match the predictions
theoretically based on a neural framework assuming continuous
representations of word meanings in a neural field (for a
formal implementation and simulation of the predictions, see
Supplementary Material Data Sheet 1).
Our use of filler trials, additional to the central homonym
trials, indicated several additional findings that validate the
findings presented here. First, homonym trials showed a higher
error rate than all other trials, indicating that working against
the priming of the wrong context and identifying weakly related
associates were a difficult task for our participants compared
to the standard association trials. Second, in catch trials, when
no relatedness between the two words was present, participants
were slower but showed less errors. This finding supports the
assumption that participants aimed at identifying associations
(instead of the opposite strategy of excluding associations) and
only responded with judgments of no relatedness after checking
twice. This also indicates, that despite the high error rates,
participants did not simply guess in the most difficult trials
(unprimed—weakly related associates), but still performed the
task they should have performed so that mouse movements in
correct trials still contain the trace of the processes of interest.
It has to be noted that our participants experienced all
homonyms twice to increase the absolute number of trials. In
light of previous findings, i.e., of primacy effects in ambiguity
resolution (Gorfein et al., 2000), it was important that our
analyses indicated no substantial difference between the first and
the second experience.
Could our results also be explained by priming effects as they
would also be present in a simple word/ non-word recognition
task?While this would question our interpretation of the priming
effect as an indicator of shifting-flexibility, results from pretests
(Dshemuchadse, 2009) contradict such an interpretation. When
we varied the temporal presentation order of the associate and
the homonym, priming effects were much larger when the
homonym was presented first (as in the study reported here).
Hence, processing the homonym built up an expectation that
participants had to overcome to identify the unprimed associated
and this exactly matches our definition of shifting flexibility.
Beside the central findings of our study, three further
theoretical and methodological implications for psychological
research can be discussed.
First, our results and the underlying theoretical framework
question the reduction of cognitive flexibility to one single
construct, namely shifting flexibility. Representing cognitive
flexibility with only one parameter, i.e., the neural gain parameter
in both task switching (O’Reilly, 2006; Herd et al., 2014)
and ambiguity resolution (Plaut and Booth, 2000) confounds
the two subtypes: In neural field models, manipulating the
gain parameter leads to changes in both, stability and breadth
(specificity) of activation and hence to a dependence of shifting
and spreading flexibility as defined here. In the light of our
results, this dependence can be questioned. In our framework,
we assumed shifting flexibility to be related to the stability of
neural activation patterns as reflected in the strength of neural
self-excitation. In contrast, spreading flexibility was related to
the breadth of the spread of neural activation. Concerning
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FIGURE 7 | RT (left) and error rates (right) as a function of trial type. Errorbars indicate standard-errors.
the conceptualization of control dilemmas, more complex
elaborations (Goschke, 2012) indeed distinguish between a
shielding-shifting and a selection-monitoring dilemma, pointing
to different underlying parameters. Our results support this
distinction and show that although the common effects of
positive mood might indicate only one dilemma (Goschke
and Bolte, 2014), the distinction should be made. With our
paradigm, we show that it is possible to meet both demands:
to shift cognitive sets and to spread across cognitive sets.
Furthermore, we suggest that the selection-monitoring dilemma
can be extended from the breadth of attention to breadth of
activation in the semantic space (compare Rowe et al., 2007).
Notably, the complementary nature of the dilemmas implies that
any benefits of a certain configuration—for both, shifting and
spreading flexibility—also come with costs: In accordance with
this, we assume for shifting flexibility that a smaller effect of
priming implies not only easier switching but also less benefit
when staying; concerning spreading flexibility, we expect that a
broader spreading could lead to difficulties when focusing on one
concept or when distinguishing concepts is necessary.
Second, the way we implemented shifting and spreading
flexibility suggests that the difference between these two types
in our experiment cannot be reduced to other distinctions of
cognitive flexibility or cognitive control. Concerning the latter,
a distinction between proactive and reactive control had been
propose previously (Brown et al., 2007; Braver, 2012). However,
whether subjects had to switch to the unprimed meaning of the
homonym (shifting flexibility) or whether they had to search
for the weak association (spreading flexibility) was only evident
when the word-pairs appeared on the screen. Hence, they were
unforeseeable and in both cases triggered externally or under
reactive control. In terms of cognitive control processes the
proposed difference between shifting and spreading flexibility
could bemapped to a distinction between a switching component
and a searching component. This latter distinction is related to
two types of cognitive flexibility as proposed by Eslinger and
Grattan, namely reactive flexibility and spontaneous flexibility
(Eslinger and Grattan, 1993). However, these types are assumed
to be more general than the types of flexibility, we propose here.
Especially, while reactive flexibility refers to the instructed or
demanded shifting of cognitive sets as we specify for the shifting
flexibility, spontaneous flexibility refers to the free search for
knowledge bypassing automatic responses in order to attend
to more divergent ideas, thus going beyond our definition of
spreading flexibility. This difference could be due to the different
methods: while Eslinger and Grattan’s types of flexibility are
based on the study of brain lesions, we used an experimental
approach that was based on neural parameters. It is an open
question if a combination of the different types of cognitive
flexibility might lead to a finer differentiation matching both
definitions.
Third, we provided a methodological alternative to the
correlational approach common in research on executive
functions by combining within-task manipulations with mouse
movement analyses. Instead of correlations across participants,
the analysis of variance and temporal dynamics in trials allowed
us to examine the distinction of shifting and spreading flexibility
with a small sample of participants.
Overall, we argue that distinguishing two types of cognitive
flexibility, namely shifting and spreading flexibility, as
components of executive functions could reveal new insight
into the process underlying flexible, goal oriented behavior.
Furthermore, we present a continuous relatedness judgment task
facilitating further research in the intersecting field of executive
functions and semantic processing.
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